THE VISION OF ISLAM AND NATIONALITY OF ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN INDONESIA: STUDY OF NAHDLATUL WATHAN, AL-IRSYAD AND AL-WASHLIYYAH

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ABSTRACT

Purpose: This article elaborates the Islamic vision and nationality of Islamic organizations in Indonesia, particularly Hahdhatul Wathan, Al-Irsyad and Al-Wasliyyah.

Theoretical framework: In the context above, this research will be designed and carried out, namely conducting an exploration of the Islamic vision and nationality of three Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely: al-Wasliyyah, al-Irsyad, and Nahdhatul Wathan.

Design/methodology/approach: The research uses descriptive-qualitative methods, and is included in field research. In obtaining the data, the instruments that the researcher used were in-depth interviews, observations, and studies of related documents.

Findings: From the research conducted, it can be seen that First, Nahdlatul Wathan is one of the Islamic organizations that has a very nationalist vision and perspective of nationalism. However, the nationalism (wathaniyah) of Nahdlatul Wathan does not necessarily follow the trend developed by secular Western-European countries.

Research, Practical & Social implications: In many ways, Nahdlatul Wathan's national and Islamic vision is very similar to that of Nahdlatul Ulama. Both of them accepted Pancasila as the principle of organization, believed in Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, and highly valued Islamic culture as a link in the chain of Islamic scholarship.

Originality/value: This research contributes to the development of Islamic discourse in Indonesia. The nationalism that Nahdlatul Wathan guides is Religious-Nationalism, namely nationalism that does not come out of religious principles and teachings, nationalism that is built on religious values, and nationalism that synergizes with religion because it is part of religious teachings.

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A VISÃO DO ISLÃ E A NACIONALIDADE DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES RELIGIOSAS ISLÂMICAS NA INDONÉSIA: ESTUDO DE NAHDLATUL WATHAN, AL-IRSYAD E AL-WASHLIYYAH

RESUMO

Propósito: Este artigo elabora a visão islâmica e a nacionalidade das organizações islânicas na Indonésia, particularmente Hahdhatul Wathan, Al-Irsyad e Al-Wasliyyah.

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Quadro teórico: No contexto acima, esta pesquisa será projetada e realizada, ou seja, a realização de uma exploração da visão islâmica e da nacionalidade de três organizações islâmicas na Indonésia, ou seja: al-Washliyah, Al-Irsyad e Nahdhatul Wathan.

Design/metodologia/abordagem: A pesquisa utiliza métodos descritivos-qualitativos e está incluída na pesquisa de campo. Na obtenção dos dados, os instrumentos utilizados pela pesquisadora foram entrevistas a fundo, observações e estudos de documentos relacionados.

Descobertas: A partir da pesquisa realizada, pode-se ver que, primeiro, Nahdlatul Wathan é uma das organizações islâmicas que tem uma visão e perspectiva muito nacionalista do nacionalismo. No entanto, o nacionalismo (wathaniyah) de Nahdlatul Wathan não segue necessariamente a tendência desenvolvida pelos países seculares da Europa Ocidental.

Investigação, implicações práticas e sociais: Em muitos aspectos, a visão nacional e islâmica de Nahdlatul Wathan é muito semelhante á de Nahdlatul Ulama. Ambos aceitaram Pancasila como o princípio da organização, acreditando em Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, e altamente valorizada cultura islâmica como um elo na cadeia de estudos islâmicos.

Originalidade/valor: Esta pesquisa contribui para o desenvolvimento do discurso islâmico na Indonésia. O nacionalismo que Nahdlatul Wathan orienta é o Religioso-Nacionalismo, ou seja, o nacionalismo que não vem de princípios e ensinamentos religiosos, o nacionalismo que é construído sobre valores religiosos, e o nacionalismo que se sinergiza com a religião porque é parte dos ensinamentos religiosos.

Palavras-chave: Visão Islâmica, Nacionalidade, Nahdhatul Wathan, Al-Irsyad, Al-Wasliyyah.

LA VISIÓN DEL ISLAM Y LA NACIONALIDAD DE LAS ORGANIZACIONES RELIGIOSAS ISLÁMICAS EN INDONESIA: ESTUDIO DE NAHDLATUL WATHAN, AL-IRSYAD Y AL-WASHLIYAH

RESUMEN
Propósito: Este artículo desarrolla la visión islámica y la nacionalidad de las organizaciones islámicas en Indonesia, particularmente Nahdhatul Wathan, Al-Irsyad y Al-Wasliyyah.

Marco teórico: En el contexto anterior, se diseñará y llevará a cabo esta investigación, a saber, la realización de una exploración de la visión islámica y la nacionalidad de tres organizaciones islámicas en Indonesia, a saber: al-Washliyah, Al-Irsyad y Nahdhatul Wathan.

Diseño/metodología/enfoque: La investigación utiliza métodos descriptivo-qualitativos, y se incluye en la investigación de campo. Para la obtención de los datos, los instrumentos utilizados por el investigador fueron entrevistas en profundidad, observaciones y estudios de documentos relacionados.

Resultados: De la investigación realizada, se puede ver que Primero, Nahdlatul Wathan es una de las organizaciones islámicas que tiene una visión y perspectiva muy nacionalista del nacionalismo. Sin embargo, el nacionalismo (wathaniyah) de Nahdlatul Wathan no necesariamente sigue la tendencia desarrollada por los países seculares de Europa Occidental.

Investigación, implicaciones prácticas y sociales: En muchos sentidos, la visión nacional e islámica de Nahdlatul Wathan es muy similar a la de Nahdlatul Ulama. Ambos aceptaron a Pancasila como el principio de organización, creyeron en Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, y valoraron altamente la cultura islámica como un eslabón en la cadena de la erudición islámica.

Originalidad/valor: Esta investigación contribuye al desarrollo del discurso islámico en Indonesia. El nacionalismo que Nahdlatul Wathan guía es el nacionalismo religioso, es decir, el nacionalismo que no surge de principios y enseñanzas religiosas, el nacionalismo que se basa en valores religiosos y el nacionalismo que se sinergiza con la religión porque es parte de las enseñanzas religiosas.

Palabras clave: Visión Islámica, Nacionalidad, Nahdhatul Wathan, Al-Irsyad, Al-Wasliyyah.

INTRODUCTION
The existence of Islamic organizations in Indonesia, seems to be quite influential on the development of various kinds of thinking in Indonesia. Since the beginning of its development (twentieth century), apart from being a form of ijtiad struggle from being individual (fardiy)
to collective (*jama'iyy*), the presence of Islamic organizations has always carried out at least three main agendas, namely: da'wa, education, and social. From these three agendas, different characters developed from one organization to another.

Since 1905 in Indonesia, Islamic organizations have developed such as Jami’at Khair (1905), al-Irsyad (1911), SDI (Syarikat Dagang Islam) (1911), Muhammadiyah (1912), Persatuan Islam (1920), Nahdhatul Ulama (1926), Al-Jami’atul Washliyah (1930) and Al Ittihadiyah (1935). The birth of these Islamic organizations is a response to the entry of ideas for renewal of Islamic thought, especially in the field of education in order to educate the nation's life to achieve independence. In addition, the role of Islamic organizations in the effort to seize independence in physical terms (arms contact) cannot be ignored. The “jihad resolution” is a concrete form and at the same time a historical fact that Islamic organizations have fought with the army and all Indonesian people in an effort to expel the invaders from Indonesian soil. If before independence the existence of Islamic organizations was as a crater for “*candradimuka*” which gave birth to a lot of intellectuals of fighters, then the atmosphere became somewhat different after independence. Each organization often competes for power and sympathy to gain mass support. In fact, there are also organizations that originally participated in the struggle for independence, but after independence they were considered as organizations that deviated from the ideals of the Indonesian people.

After the reform, the existence of Islamic organizations is increasingly finding the momentum to develop. They are no longer afraid to speak the “truth” that they have been hiding for so long. Even the opportunity to form new organizations is getting wide open. The reformation era seemed to open a faucet for the growth and development of Islamic organizations which were initially stalled by the ruling regime. From a more positive side, the reform era marked the birth of “the real democracy” in which the people were given the breadth and freedom to voice their opinions. On the other hand, the reform era also opened the way for various kinds of polarization in almost all aspects of people's lives. Both sides are interesting, because, when freedom of expression is accompanied by ideological polarization from other nations that is not in line with the philosophy and ideology of the Indonesian nation, it can threaten the life of the nation and state. Especially when transnational ideologies that are radical and extreme also continue to develop and look for loopholes to enter countries like Indonesia.

Recent developments show that the ideological polarization referred to above is increasingly visible when the issue of radicalism becomes a serious concern from many circles. In addition, efforts to clash between state and religion as separate and incompatible concepts
have strengthened again in the midst of changing socio-political conditions in Indonesia. This condition, of course, cannot be tolerated and requires the efforts of many parties to continue to study why this is happening and to find a solution on how to immediately overcome it. The effort to map Islamic organizations into puritan, moderate, liberal, or other typologies is one of the efforts to determine who are our “friends” and who are our “opponents” as Muslims and the Indonesian nation at the same time. Everyone may differ in their understanding of the concept of being Muslim and being Indonesian. However, when the two are clashed as a concept that negates each other, then it clearly contradicts the basic principles, both in Islam and the basic mandate of the Indonesian state (Ibrahim et al., 2023).

In the context above, this research will be designed and carried out, namely conducting an exploration of the Islamic vision and nationality of three Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely: al-Washliyah, al-Irsyad, and Nahdhatul Wathan. This exploration will provide an overview to the public about the position of the three mass organizations, whether they are puritan (radical-extreme), moderate (Indonesian-Islamic), or liberal (Islam-western oriented).

When compared to Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyyah, all three are indeed inferior in terms of the number of followers. However, in terms of their role and contribution to the sustainability and progress of the Indonesian nation, the three cannot be ignored. Al-Washliyah has a major role in advancing da’wah, education, and social life in the Medan area and its other distribution centers. Al-Irsyad, although initially established in the Jakarta area, is now growing in many areas with its contributions in the fields of da’wah, education, and social society which are also not small. Nahdhatul Wathan, an Islamic organization with the largest mass base of followers in West Nusa Tenggara (Mataram), its role in the fields of da’wah, education, and social work is also unquestionable. The three Islamic organizations have given birth to many educational institutions, educated people, and community leaders whose roles and contributions to the progress of the nation and state cannot be ignored.

In addition to the issue of the great contribution to the independence and progress of the nation and state, there are several other considerations why this research was carried out, namely: first, it is different from NU and Muhammadiyyah where the popularity of both in Islamic discourse in Indonesia is quite dominant, al-washliyah, al-Irsyad, and al-Irsyad. Nahdhatul Wathan seems to be in a peripheral area that needs to be brought to the surface so that the Islamic public will understand the existence of the three more. Second, the three moderation principles have not been widely studied academically. Especially if the principle of moderation is drawn in the context of the vision of Islam and Indonesianness. This is certainly
different from NU and Muhammadiyyah who have repeatedly emphasized their moderation principle which is also shared by many experts.

Third, people in Indonesia need to obtain a lot of information about Islamic organizations in Indonesia in terms of whether these organizations are organizations that are anti-government and power systems in Indonesia or that can accept the system as an agreement with all the people and the Indonesian nation at the beginning of independence. Information about the Islamic and Indonesian vision of al-Washliyyah, al-Irsyad, and Nahdhatul Wathan will certainly be very useful for the community because it can increase their knowledge base and at the same time guide the behavior of the three Islamic organizations. Fourth, the existence of the three organizations studied has represented the Muslim region in Indonesia from a geographical and regional point of view. Al-Washliyyah is a representation of Islamic organizations in Sumatra, al-Irsyad in Java, and Nahdhatul Wathan in West Nusa Tenggara. These three areas have unique social and religious characteristics, so it makes sense when this research focuses on these three areas.

In addition to the four reasons above, there are several other reasons that make the authors believe that this research will later make many positive contributions to the development of Islamic discourse in Indonesia. However, the issue of Islam and nationality in Indonesia always leaves a vacant lot to be studied and researched because of its uniqueness and complexity. The presence of this research is part of the compiler's efforts to fill the vacant land so that it is more valuable.

METHODOLOGY

This research is included in the type of field research, the author will do this on three Islamic organizations (al-Washliyyah, al-Irsyad, and Nahdhatul Wathan) and involve a lot of field data (empirical). In addition, this research is included in qualitative research that uses humans as research tools, is descriptive-explorative, limits the study to the focus of the problem, and the research results are agreed upon by the researchers and research subjects (Soehada, 2008).

In qualitative research, the researcher also acts as a research instrument. In the ongoing data collection process, researchers are really expected to be able to interact with the object (society) that is the research target. That is, researchers use a natural approach and are sensitive to the symptoms seen, heard, felt and thought about. The success of research is highly dependent on field data, so certainty, accuracy, detail, completeness and flexibility of recording
information observed in the field are very important. Improper recording of field data will be detrimental to the researcher himself and will make it difficult for the analysis to draw research conclusions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Organization of Community: An Epistemological Study

Organization is etymologically derived from the word “organon”, namely “organum” which means: part, body or body, so that it becomes a collection or group of people consisting of different backgrounds with the aim of equating perceptions in a bond that has the same goal (Alwi, 2002). The organization is a human association that strives to achieve harmonious common goals based on harmonious relationships that work together on the basis of rights, obligations and responsibilities by achieving goals (Manulang, 2015).

While "society" consists of the meaning of "society" which means a collection of individuals who live together as a large unit who need each other, have the same characteristics as a community group. Thus, a community organization is a group of people who have goals that are both formulated in ideological values, and the same will is validated in a structured management that has compatibility at levels, and has dedication and responsibility for the interests of the management they lead, education, and strata of life, and so on according to the needs of the wider community.

In UU (Law) no. 17 of 2013, the community states that community organizations (Ormas) are groups founded and formed by the community voluntarily based on common aspirations, desires, needs, interests, activities and goals to participate in development in order to achieve the goals of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

It is undeniable that the existence of mass organizations in Indonesia has been present in all forms in welcoming Indonesia's development, mass organizations have become a filter for development since Indonesia was still a colony until now Indonesia is independent and more advanced, the ideal source is Pancasila and the spirit of diversity embedded in the human soul. Indonesia. Pancasila is a unifying symbol for the global community to respect and respect each other on the basis of the spirit of diversity in ethnic diversity, mass organizations also have the principle of struggle as an organization that is in synergy and does not conflict with Pancasila, and makes Pancasila the principle of the organization it forms (Soumadi & Smadi, 2023).
Organizations in the Islamic concept are a means of delivering messages to the people or society quickly and accurately (Ismail, 2019). Regarding organization, there are at least two words in the Qur'an to study this, namely the word *(shaff)* and *(ummah)*. The words of the shaff when associated with the organization become a line led by an imam in prayer (Fouzelah, Hanisah Zafirah Binti Yusuf & Nilyati, 2019). Thus the word *shaff* can be interpreted as a group or congregation that is led. Organization according to the explanation of this sentence is an association consisting of people or congregations who have a system that is arranged in an orderly manner in order to achieve a common goal. This is as explained in surah Ash-Shaff verse 4 as follows:

\[\text{innallāha yuḥibbullażīna yuqātilụna fī sabīlihī ṣaffang ka`annahum bun-yānum marṣuş}\]

[Verily, Allah loves those who fight in His cause in orderly ranks, as if they were like a solidly built structure].

The purpose of the surah does not mean ordering war or making chaos, but the intended shaff is ordering to enter a line (organization) so that there is order to achieve the goal. In a hadith explained which means "Verily Allah loves people who when doing a job is done properly, directed and complete" (Akhmadi, 2019).

In the explanation of the science of *shaaraf*, the word "*ta'aawanu*" originally is "*ta'aawun*" which later in Arabic contains the original meaning of "*tafaa'ul*" which then has a meaning, one of which is the meaning of "mutual". Like the sentence "*tawaashau*" in the letter al-Asr verse 3:

\[\text{illallażīna āmanụ wa 'amiluṣ-ṣāliḥāti wa tawāṣau bil-ḥaqqi wa tawāṣau biṣ-sabr}\]

[Except those who believe and do good deeds and exhort one another to truth and exhort one another to patience].

The two verses above show that there is a two-way interaction which has meaning as a coordinated activity based on direction between people who understand the goals they want or have one goal in exchanging opinions, deliberation for the sake of goodness in increasing piety or behaviors that can make sins and forbidden (Fouzelah, Hanisah Zafirah Binti Yusuf & Nilyati, 2019).

The Prophet Muhammad gave an example of a good role model where in interacting and delivering the message of God’s revelation very well and even succeeded in preaching Islam so that it spread throughout the world, even becoming a great religion for the creatures that inhabit the earth. This explains the meaning that the king has carried out organizational
activities. A very clear example where he put the Companions in position and burdened them with the right tasks. Then the friends carried out the mandate very well.

From the spirit that has been instilled by the Prophet Muhammad, then in Islam this spirit continues to grow today. However, there are some groups or groups that define the Prophet's struggle to create an Islamic Religious Organization movement that emerged after the death of the caliph Usman Bin Affan ra, so that groups occur in Islam and each is in the name of his true self. This is where the misinterpretation begins. However, this does not mean that Islam advocates mutual hostility, in essence amar ma'ruf nahi munkar is a form of unity that advises each other in goodness and safety, not the other way around. Based on the spirit of togetherness as exemplified by the Messenger of Allah, Islamic Organizations were thus formed which in turn called for Islamic Organizations to revive religious spirit. The Islamic organizations referred to here are Islamic religious organizations (Zuhdi, 2010).

**Islamic Community Organizations (Ormas) and Islamic Moderation in Indonesia**

Moderate Islam or Islamic moderation is one of many terminologies that has emerged in the study of Islamic thought, especially in the last two decades, it can even be said that Islamic moderation is the hottest issue of this century. This term appears as the antithesis of the emergence of radical understanding in understanding and executing religious teachings or messages. Thus, discussing the discourse of Islamic moderation never escapes the discussion of radicalism in Islam. If we refer to the Koran as a reference for religious expression both at the level of understanding and application, it explicitly emphasizes the existence of moderates (Umman Wasathan) (Surat Al Baqarah: 143), as the parent for understanding Islam or as the parent for the understanding of a Muslim. moderate.

Islamic moderation can be understood as an attitude or behavior that always prioritizes the values of the middle way and does not overdo it. Moderate can also be interpreted as consistently being in the middle lane between textuality-rationality, social ritual and dogmatic-dynamic. In other words, moderate is a tolerance and compromise attitude in seeing differences. However, it also does not mean not having an attitude so as to justify or accept all differences without limits. This is certainly not a moderate attitude, but an attitude that is beyond reasonable (Pane, 2018).

The fact of Islamic moderation was shaped by the long struggle of Indonesia's Islamic history. Muhammadiyah and NU are two Islamic organizations that have crossed paths in fighting for forms of Islamic moderation, both through the educational institutions they manage.
and the socio-political-religious activities that they both play. Therefore, these two organizations deserve to be asked as two civil society institutions that are very important for the moderation process of this country. Muhammadiyah and NU are two socio-religious organizations that play an active role in maintaining and strengthening networks and institutions that support Islamic moderation, even making Indonesia a model project of tolerance for the outside world (Komarudin et al., 2019). As the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, NU has played a significant role in promoting tolerant and peaceful Islamic ideas (Almu’tasim, 2019).

Muhammadiyah, for example, is a modern socio-religious institution that aims to adapt the pure teachings of Islam into the life of the modern world of Indonesia. In an effort to achieve this goal, this movement has widely been inspired by the ideas of Shaykh Muhammad Abduh's renewal, which ignited the spirit of reforming the cleansing of Islam from historical climbs that have been considered an inseparable part of Islam (Fuadi, 2018).

Muhammadiyah's moderation attitude has actually been built from the beginning by the founder of this organization, namely K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. It can be seen that one of the most valuable lessons from Ahmad Dahlan's leadership is his strong commitment to moderation and religious tolerance. During his leadership, creative and harmonious collaboration with almost all community groups can be seen. Even with his fellow Christians, he is able to promote respect and tolerance. The most interesting example of the ability of K.H. Ahmad Dahlan is tying close friendships with many Christian religious leaders. The fact that he is known as a person who is tolerant of Christian missionaries does not mean that he compromises his principles. He is a true practitioner of interfaith dialogue, in the sense that he hears what is said and pays attention to what is implied behind the words spoken (Fuadi, 2018). Even further, Maarif stated that: “the modernist movement, especially Muhammadiyah, is increasingly considering the cultural dimension in its da’wah movement so that it feels more flexible without losing its main principles and mission. Persis and Al-Irsyad persisted, but never followed their partner Muhammadiyah which continued to expand” (Maarif, 2009).

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah's younger brother, NU, is basically inseparable from the Ahlusunnah waljama'ah (Aswaja) faith which can be classified as moderate. In NU's Articles of Association, it is stated that NU as Jam'iyah Diniyah Islamiyah has Islamic beliefs according to Ahlussunah waljamaah understanding by acknowledging the four schools of thought, namely Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi'i, and Hambali. A detailed description, that in the field of faith, NU follows the Ahlussunah waljamaah understanding which was pioneered by Imam Abu Hasan
Al-Asy'ari, and Imam Abu Mansyur Al-Maturidi. In the field of fiqh, NU follows the approach (al-mazhab) of the Abu Hanifah Al-Nu'man School, Imam Malik ibn Anas, Imam Muhammad ibn Idris Al-Syafi'i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbali. In the field of Sufism, he followed, among others, Imam al-Junaid al-Bagdadi and Imam al-Ghazali (Qomar, 2002).

The term of Ahlusunnah waljama'ah can be interpreted as "followers of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and the ijma (agreement) of the scholars (ulama)". Meanwhile, moderate character (tawassuth) is the most prominent characteristic of Ahlussunah waljamaah, in addition to i'tidal (being fair), tawazun (being balanced), and tasamuh (being tolerant), so that he rejects all forms of extreme thoughts and actions (tatharruf) which can give birth to deviations and deviations from Islamic teachings. In religious thought, a balance is also developed between the use of revelation (naqliyah) and ratio ('aqliyah) so that it is possible to accommodate-harmony to changes in society as long as it does not go against dogmatic doctrines. As a derivative of moderate attitudes, Ahlussunah waljamaah also has attitudes that are more tolerant of tradition than the understanding of other Islamic groups. For Ahlussunah, maintaining tradition has an important meaning in religious life. A tradition is not immediately rejected entirely, nor is it completely accepted, but tries to be gradually Islamized (filled with Islamic values) (Lombard, 1984). Aswaja's thinking is very tolerant of pluralism of thought. Various thoughts that grow in the Muslim community get an appreciative response. In this case Aswaja is very responsive to the ideas of various schools of thought, not only those that still exist in the community (the Hani, Malik, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools), but also to the schools that were born such as Imam Daud al-Dhahiri, Imam Abdurrahman al-Auza'i, Imam Sufyan al-Tsauri, and others (Muhammad, 1999).

The conclusion from the explanation above, NU can be legitimately said to be the heir to the guardians in Indonesia. It is known that the efforts of the guardians to use various non-Islamic elements is a wise approach. Does not the Qur'an recommend a wise method, namely "call people to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good advice" (Mas' ud, 2004).

Responding to community developments, NU circles try to respect local culture and traditions. Similar methods have been used by their predecessors, namely the Walisongo, by always tolerating local traditions, which are then injected with Islamic values. We can take an example when Walisongo persuasively converted Javanese society to Islam and replaced the Hindu-Buddhist forces in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is not an intervention, but an acculturation and assimilation in living side by side with diverse social backgrounds. This is an expression of "cultural Islam" or "moderate Islam" in which there is the role of ulama
as agents of social change which is understood at a macro level by maintaining and respecting local traditions by subordinating profane local culture into sacred Islamic values (Fithriyyah & Umam, 2018).

The two mass organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, were organizations that consistently guarded the Indonesian nation even before the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Not only that, they also have no history of rebellion against the Indonesian people either through understanding or action. Both of them still recognize nationalism to this day that Indonesia is an Islamic country even without the formalization of sharia. Islam and the State are final and no longer need to be clashed. To emphasize this commitment, even NU circles echo a doctrine that is not yet known in any region of the world, namely: "Love for the homeland (nationalism) is a sign of faith". The doctrine voiced by Hadratus Shaykh Hasyim Asy'ari resolves the often of tense relations between religion and the state. Also, this doctrine makes Indonesia a religious democracy, which is neither secular nor atheist.

Community Organizations and Religious Dynamics in Indonesia: Majority-Minority Logic

Various studies have shown the factors that e to the development of intolerance and discrimination of religious minorities. In the Regional Head Election (Pilkada), for example, attitudes or policies related to minorities sometimes become a bet for a candidate to be elected or not. Usually, minorities are groups that are shunned or even part of the agreement letter between the candidate for regional head and certain mass organizations that the minority will be dissolved or inhibited if he is elected as regional head. Others see intolerance in Indonesia as a result of the proxy war in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran. There are also those who see the phenomenon of intolerance as a global phenomenon of rising conservatism in various parts of the world.

By not denying these factors as well as other existing factors, Najib Burhani saw several cultural issues that caused some people not to feel that there had been various discriminations and intolerances against certain religious minorities in Indonesia. Burhani divides this issue into five groups: 1) messianic tendency (feeling to be a savior), 2) false virtue (wrong virtue), 3) euphemistic narrative of intolerance, 4) conservative mental construction (mental construction), conservative), and 5) delimited pluralism (Burhani, 2020).

As Edward Said described when they saw Europeans colonizing the people of Africa and Asia, they felt that what they were doing was civilizing, not colonializing (Burhani, 2020).
They considered the people of Asia and Africa at that time to be uncivilized, uncultured, backward, or even half-human. Their presence in Asian and African countries is to make them civilized, not barbaric. Likewise, with the United States when they attacked Afghanistan and Iraq. Jargons that are often used are liberating (liberating) and democraticizing (making democratic). Their presence in these countries is like a savior, not a domination, or seeking economic gain.

Similar to these logics, one of the aims of the 2005 MUI Fatwa on Ahmadiyah is "to immediately return to the true teachings of Islam (al-ruju’ ila al-haqq)." That the Ahmadiyya need to be saved from their misguidance, if necessary, by force. Therefore, when there was an attempt to return the Ahmadiyya to Islam in West Java in 2011, the term used was “Operation of Sajadah” because they wanted to return the Ahmadiyya to the true faith.

Logic as above also occurs in laws and regulations such as Law no. 1/PNPS/1965. In the explanation of the Law, for example, it is stated: With regard to mystical bodies/schools, the Government tries to channel them towards a healthy view and towards the One Godhead. This is in accordance with the MPRS Decree No. II/MPRS/1960, appendix A. Field I, point 6. Followers of certain religious minorities are considered as “non-religious” or “not yet religious” or following deviant and unhealthy teachings so that they need to be treated and brought back or fostered to understanding healthy religion.

FPI is often accused of being the main perpetrator of various acts of intolerance and discrimination in society. This is not completely wrong. However, their actions occurred because many community members gave endorsements (support) and condoning (agreeing silently or pretending not to see) what they were doing. This is part of the so-called culture of intolerance. Apart from that, the pluralism adopted by the Indonesian people is limited pluralism. This can be seen through the implementation of pluralism and tolerance which is more directed at those who fall into the category of six "recognized" religions. This then gave birth to favoritism and full service only to "recognized" or "official" religions. In one of the interviews Burhani conducted with a figure who often initiates attacks against Ahmadiyah, for example, he felt that his actions could not be categorized as a violation of religious freedom because Ahmadiyah was neither a religion nor a part of Islam (Burhani, 2020).

An understanding of the existence of delimited pluralism also gives birth to categorization or stratification in carrying out religious services. This, for example, is stated in Law no. 1/PNPS/1965 which is still applied today and is ingrained in the hearts of the people. The three categories of religion are:
1. The group of six religions that are “embraced by the population in Indonesia”;
2. Religious groups referred to in the PNPS/1965 as being “allowed to exist”, such as the Baha’i, Sikhs, and Jews;
3. There are quite a number of sects or adherents of belief scattered in various places in Indonesia

In this stratification, the six religions which the majority are embraced by Indonesians receive several privileges. They "get the guarantees as provided by Article 29 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, they also get the assistance and protection as provided by this article". Different from the six religions, ancestral religions or religions originating from Indonesia, such as Kaharingan, Parmalim, and Sunda Wiwitan, are not mentioned at all.

In addition to giving birth to religious classification, delimited pluralism also gives birth to favoritism based on the number of adherents or is proportional, as happened in the management structure at the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB). Religion with a large number of adherents will get more services and more positions. Meanwhile, minority religious groups are even forced to modify their theological beliefs to be considered equal to mainstream religions. This theological modification applies not only to ancestral religions, but also to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.

With delimited pluralism, the definition of religion also follows the criteria of mainstream religion, such as the acknowledgment of the existence of God Almighty, as well as the existence of prophets and holy books. With this definition, other religions must conform theologically. If not, then it is not considered a religion or downgraded to a mere belief. Hinduism and Buddhism, for example, must modify and rationalize beliefs so that they are similar to monotheistic religious beliefs. Hindus define "Sang Hyang Widi" which was previously not too central in this religion as the embodiment of God Almighty. Meanwhile, Buddhism considers the Adi Buddha character, a name taken from an Old Javanese text, as the One God. The same is true of Confucianism. To become a "religion", Confucius appointed Confucius as a prophet and the Fourth Book as a holy book:

**Religious Nationalism: The National and Islamic Vision of Nahdlatul Wathan**

Nahdlatul Wathan is an independent organization that has no connection with other mass organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyyah. However, when viewed from the existing Islamic character, Nahdlatul Wathan seems to have a closer relationship with NU than Muhammadiyyah. This of course can’t be separated from the figure of TG. Zainuddin, who was
appointed as the consulate of NU in the 1950s, was a representative of the Lesser Sunda island. The position as a consulate is certainly based on the similarity of religious ideology between NU and TG Zainuddin. In fact, if NU did not decide to leave Masyumi, Nahdlatul Wathan’s position would always be attached to NU. NU’s political choice to leave Masyumi and TG Zainudin's choice to remain in Masyumi made the two ideologically separated. In addition, the demand to accommodate educational institutions in Lombok made TG Zainudin stronger his desire to educate organizations independently, not in the shadow of NU or other mass organizations (Baharuddin, 2007).

In terms of creed, Nahdlatul Wathan follows the understanding of ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah as the NU people. As for fiqh, Nahdlatul Wathan explicitly states that they follow the Imam al-Shafi’i school of thought. Some of the religious rituals practiced by followers (congregations) of Nahdlatul Wathan are almost no different from those practiced by NU congregations. Even to refer to the congregation or their followers, both Nahdlatul Wathan and NU both use the term "nahdhiyyin". Not only that, one of Aswaja’s principles in Nahdlatul Wathan as voiced by TGH Zainudin, "Turahhibu bi al-hadith wa tahtarimu al-qadim wa tarbitu bainahuma" which means "welcoming the new (innovation) - respecting the old (reflection of tradition) and binding/connecting the two (moderation), seems to be in line with the principle popularized by NU, "al-Muhafazah ala al-qadim al-shalih wa al-akhzu bi al-jadid al-ashlah" (Nasri, 2019).

The involvement of Nahdlatul Wathan in the process of the establishment of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and the dynamics of the life of the nation and state after independence is quite important and strategic. The role of the figure of TGH Zainudij Majid in doctrinating love for the homeland and defending the country contributed to the birth of the fighting spirit of the people at that time, especially on the island of Lombok. Even so strong was the spiritual injection given by TGH Zainuddin, his younger brother had to be willing to die Syahid in the struggle against the Dutch colonialists. For this service, President Joko Widodo in 2017 awarded the title of National Hero to TGH Muhammad Zainudin Abdul Majid.

In terms of naming the organization, "Nahdlatul Wathan" itself implies a strong message of nationalism. Nationalism is extracted from religious values (Islam) to always love the homeland and nation. Loving the country as a place to fight for the dignity and dignity of the nation is a religious commandment that cannot be rejected.
To be able to understand how the spirit of nationalism was built by TGH Zainuddin, Mars Nahdlatul Wathan so clearly describes it. Not only Mars Nahdlatul Wathan, TGH Zainuddin also composed many songs of struggle which contained calls to fight colonialism and seize independence.

In terms of organizational movements and programs, Nahdlatul Wathan has four organizational pillars (arba' afkar) that show the character and distinctiveness of Nahdlatul Wathan compared to other Islamic organizations, namely: First, fikrah nahdhiyah (resurrection thought) which includes nahdlah tarbawiyah (education awakening), nahdhah ijtimaiyyah (social awakening), nahdhah dakwatiyah (revival of da'wah). Second, fikrah wathaniyah: national thought. This is done by referring to Indonesia as bilady (my country), indunisiyya, Wathany (my nation). These terms are often found in nationalist songs by TGH Zainuddin, including Mars Nahdlatul Wathan. In addition, to refer to the Sasak people who are very strong in their tribal primordialism, TGH also always embeds Indonesia behind words that indicate tribal or regional meaning, such as: “Anti ya Fancur bilady, Ya fata Sasak bi Indonesia”. Third, Fikrah Siyasiyah. This can be seen in TGH Zainuddin's political thinking about the political upheaval at that time and his ideas about Pancasila democracy. Even at the practical level, TGH Zainuddin was also involved in practical political activities in 1955-1997. Fourth, Fikrah Diniyah Islamiyyah, which includes creed, morality, and fiqh. In the field of faith, Nahdlatul Wathan decided to follow the creed of Ahlusunnah wal Jama'ah. In the field of fiqh, the Shafi'i school was chosen as the official school of the organization. While in the field of morals (taswuf) the thoughts of Imam Junaid al-Bagdadi and Imam al-Ghazali are used as role models. Thus, it can be emphasized that the Nahdlatul Wathan organization is an Islamic organization that operates in the realms of: Rabbaniyah, Nabawiyah, Insaniyah, Ummatiyah, Kauniyah, Alamiyah which are packaged in the Wasatiyah Islamic frame (moderate) (Nasri, 2019).

**Hadramism and Salafism: National and Islamic Vision of Al-Irsyad**

As has been explained in the previous discussion, the embryonic formation of al-Irsyad was not purely because of a call for renewal or following the trend of the movement for independence that was flourishing at that time. The formation of al-Irsyad, including Jami'at khair, was more motivated by the existence of ethnic sentiments that occurred in the internal Aran community (hadrami) in the archipelago. The Hadrami commune at that time was often referred to as “The Other World”, namely an exclusive social community that is separated from
Quoting what Natalie Mobini said, there are three evidences that the al-Irsyad organization is very thick with hadrami-exclusive nuances, namely: first, the fact that strong and influential branches of the organization (such as the Surabaya branch), are always dominated by Arabs. Hadrami. On the other hand, the existence of al-Irsyad branches in areas with strong indigenous members tends not to last long. Second, the identity of Hadrami al-Irsyad can be observed from the official language used in the publishing business managed by al-Irsyad. Throughout the early decades of its establishment, the magazines published by al-Irsyad were always in Arabic with a minor supplement in Malay. This made it impossible for local residents who did not understand Arabic to fully participate in organizational life. Third, and this is what Natalie thinks is most fundamental, the top leadership of the organization is always in the hands of Hadrami Arabs (Mobini-Kesheh, 1999).

The exclusivity of al-Irsyad was still visible in the early days when this organization was officially formed. Awakening (al-Nahdhah) which is voiced by al-Irsyad as the spirit of the organization, is still interpreted narrowly as "rising up to become a complete hadrami". Not "rising" to be independent from colonialism and become an independent Indonesia as called for by other organizations. Through educational and publishing institutions he manages, al-Irsyad continues to voice territorial-patriotism, namely a deep love for their ancestral land (Arabic) not their homeland (Indonesia). In order to have a strong influence, this call for territorial-nationalism (wathaniyyah hadramiyyah) is often packaged in narratives that seem to have religious legitimacy. In a situation like this, being Indonesia is not an option (let alone a necessity) for the Hadrami Nusantara community. They still firmly hold the principle that Hadrami is an “Arab who happens to live in Indonesia”, not an “Indonesian person who happens to be of Arab descent”.

The problem of exclusivity of al-Irsyad is not only because they are "The Other" from the indigenous community and other immigrants, but also because of the strata dichotomy among their community (Hadrami) in their homeland. In the life of the Hadrami Arab community, it is known that there are social strata groupings, namely sayyid, qabil, sheikh and masakin. This stratification would certainly be a problem when applied to Arab descendants in the Dutch East Indies. Especially when the notion of the nation state began to develop and was applied in almost all colonial countries at that time. If before the 20th century the Arab community in the archipelago still had a statehood orientation in the Hadramaut state which at
that time was a British protectorate, then this orientation would begin to lose its way when the archipelago was in the territory of the Dutch colonial power. The Arab community living in the Dutch East Indies territory was integrated with local customs, spoke the local language, and even became part of the local ethnic community through marriage. From this condition, a new generation of Hadrami Arab descendants emerged in the archipelago who began to find it difficult to understand the concept of statehood of their parents who made Hadramaut their homeland (Wahyuni, 2019).

Al-Irsyad's desire to establish communal identity as part of the Hadramaut people in Indonesia seems to have reached a dead end, namely when in the 1930s al-Irsyad was deemed to have failed to expand its activities to the Hadramaut country itself (Mobini-Kesheh, 1999). This failure was proven when there was a group of Indonesian-born Hadrami youths (muwallad) who had recognized Indonesia as their homeland. Their efforts, which were accepted by Indonesian nationalists, further strengthened the development of the concept of "the Indonesian nation" in the midst of the Arab-Hadrami community in the Dutch East Indies (Mobini-Kesheh, 1999).

During the colonial period (Japan and the Netherlands), al-Irsyad really experienced difficult times to develop. It was only around 1949 that al-Irsyad began to grow again, precisely after the 27th congress was held on 21-24 August 1949. This congress was more of an evaluation in the context of the rehabilitation of organizations whose existence was always ups and downs in the pre-independence period (Badjerei, 1996).

In 1951, al-Irsyad officially became a Special Member of the Masjumi Political Party. In this case, the official members are al-Irsyad Executive Board, while the mass of al-Irsyad members are automatically considered as Masjumi Members even though they are not personally registered. Likewise, the Al-Irsyad Youths were finally also active in the GPII (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement) (Maarif, 1988). The inclusion of al-Irsyad as a member of Masjumi does not seem to have helped, even hindered, the internal rehabilitation process of al-Irsyad as championed in the 27th congress. The climax, at the 1951 Mu'tamar al-Irsyad, which was held in Solo, no al-Irsyad youth were present, because almost all of the Branch leaders of the al-Irsyad Youth and the masses of its members moved to GPII (Badjerei, 1996).

The vibrancy of the al-Irsyad movement began to appear again when the congress was held in Bondowoso in 1970, after previously being in suspended animation. One thing that was interesting about the Bondowoso congress was the removal of the name of mass organizations (mass organizations) from the constitution of al-Irsyad. Al-Irsyad will really be returned
according to the original khittah of its establishment, namely as an educational, teaching, cultural, and Islamic da’wah and community organization (Badjerei, 1996).

The big task as a result of the Bondowoso congress has not been carried out properly, al-Irsyad Returns had to face the unfortunate reality of the actions of the members of the 33rd congress in Semarang in 1982. The congress received sharp criticism from outside the organization for showing scenes that did not reflect the educated and noble character. Many inappropriate words came out of the congress members' sentences. In fact, after the DPP for the 1982-1985 period was inaugurated, there was an internal commotion which was certainly very embarrassing and detrimental to the Al-Irsyad congregation. The seizure and seizure of the organization's property, under the pretext of security and rescue, really happened at that time (Hadrami, 2020).

Another issue that also characterizes the Semarang Congress is related to the obligation for every organization, both political organizations and community organizations, to make Pancasila as the sole principle. This issue then gave rise to two groups within al-Irsyad, namely the pros and cons. In response to this, at the al-Irsyad congress in Semarang in 1982, a body called the Al-Irsyad Organizational Constitutional Completion Body (BPKO) was formed. Through this agency, two points were born in AD/ART and PD/PRT which in the history of al-Irsyad were new. First, it relates to the Single Principle, Pancasila. Second, the plan to merge or dissolve the autonomous bodies within al-Irsyad. This decision, according to Awod Martan, was caused by several groups of PB Pemuda al-Irsyad who issued political statements that were considered inconsequential and violated the existing constitution and TAP Congress Number 007 (Martan, 1985). These youth groups are said to have rejected the acceptance of Pancasila as the organization's principle.

Facing the instructions of the New Order rulers who required every official organization to make Pancasila the basis of the organization, al-Irsyad was really in a dilemmatic situation. Persist with the original principle (Islam) at the risk of being dissolved by the government, or following the wishes of the government at the risk of relying on the principle of faith. In a situation like this, an answer emerged that was offered by the majority of the organization's management in which al-Irsyad would accept Pancasila as the organizational principle on the basis of the principle of emergency (Amar, 2007).

From an Islamic-ideological perspective, al-Irsyad was founded with a salafi ideology. Ahmad Surkati was an admirer of the religious thought of Ibn Taymiyah and Muhammad Abduh (Affandi, 1999). This was even seen when he was still in Jami’at Khair. There is a
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The growing story that apart from teaching at Jami'at Khair's madrassa in the morning, Ahmad Surkati also established a study in the afternoon which was attended by young Arabs. This study aims to see the possibility of improving the understanding of Muslims in Indonesia. In addition, this study forum was also used by Surkati to find partners who could be invited to work together in developing salafi understanding. The visit of some of his friends from Sudan meant a lot to Surkati, because they could be invited to exchange ideas and insights about salafism developed by Muhammad Abduh (Affandi, 1999).

The concept of "salafism" which was developed by Surkati seems to have begun to experience a shift towards "wahhabism", especially when the al-Irsyad Islamic boarding school was founded in the Salatiga Landmark. Some circles even consider that the salafi concept developed by the Pesantren Tengaran is the forerunner to the occurrence of divisions within the body of al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah.

The existence of the al-Irsyad Islamic Boarding School in the Landmark cannot be separated from the spread of salafi ideology in the modern era (in the 1980s). This close relationship is because people like Ja'far Umar Talib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, and Yusuf Uthman Baisa are leaders at the Al-Irsyad Tengaran Islamic Boarding School who are also figures who spread salafi ideology. Interestingly, the salafi ideology that they spread is different from the understanding that has been held by the people of al-Irsyad in general.

Actually, the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran was also build in order to strengthen al-Irsyad cadres, especially in Arabic language skills. This boarding school was founded on the initiative of Umar Abdat, a businessman of Hadrami descent and chairman of the al-Irsyad branch in Semarang. Ja'far Umar Talib (because he had just finished studying in Arabia) was asked to teach at the pesantren and was even appointed as the director of the pesantren with the help of Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas. Ja'far's arrival to Indonesia seems to be at the right moment. Because at that time, al-Irsyad was in a state of crisis, especially an identity crisis (Hasan, 2008).

In 1992 the people of Al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah began to feel uncomfortable with the existing situation due to the impact of the Salafiyah da'wah which began to enter almost all of al-Irsyad's lines. At its peak, in 1993, there was a demand from the al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah Center led by Gesy Amar to disband the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, or to stop the salafiyah da'wah because it was deemed to have damaged al-Irsyad.

What was done by the three nests of Ja'far Umar Thalim, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas and Yusuf Uthman Ba'isa, was not immediately extinguished by Gesy Amar and al-Irsyad. The salafiyah da'wah developed by these three people has really spread and has an influence on the
al-Irsyad congregation in several cities. In Pekalongan, for example, two camps emerged that were equally strong in accepting or rejecting salafiyah da'wah. Starting from this, then SK 104 was born in 1998 which is often referred to as the "Cabinet Resuffel". In this case al-Irsyad at the central level split, namely between Gesy Amar who rejected the salafiyah da'wah and Muhammad Bawazir who accepted this da'wah. Both are chairman and deputy. Then, the decree was issued which fired Muhammad Bawazir and about 13 of his friends. As a result of this dismissal, the Extraordinary Mu'tamar (MLB) was born, which in turn gave birth to the al-Irsyad Association.

Moderate Islam (Al-Washl): The National and Islamic Vision of Al-Washliyah

The year 1986 became a crucial point for the development of al-Washliyah in the future. This year there was a polemic within al-Washliyah regarding the location of the congress. The previously scheduled location in Banda Aceh was shifted (due to government intervention) to Jakarta. Finally, the Haji Ciliwung Dormitory was chosen as the venue for the 1986 al-Washliyah congress. One of the important decisions made at the congress was the acceptance of Pancasila as the organizational principle. This decision was certainly welcomed by the New Order government at that time by confirming the good relationship between the government and al-Washliyah and respecting the position of al-Washliyah as an independent organization that is not affiliated with any Islamic or political organization.

The New Order government's recognition of al-Washliyah's independence did not always seem to go well. Because, at that time the government was being controlled by the Golkar Party. Golkar's hegemony over the course of power is so strong that when al-Washliyah positioned itself as an independent organization from any political party, many of the activities of al-Washliyah's organization were considered to be at odds with the government. This is also the reason why the development of al-Washliyah during the New Order era was very slow. The regeneration carried out by the organization also does not produce maximum results (Daulay, 2018).

The year 1998 also has historical significance for the development of al-Washliyah in Indonesia. This year is the year the start of a new era of government in Indonesia from the New Order era to the reform era. The presence of the reform era was used by al-Washliyah to restore "Islam" as the organizational principle as the khittah of this organization was founded. The return of "Islam" as an organizational principle was caused by the repressive actions of the New Order regime which imposed the single principle of Pancasila and limited religious activities.
to normative activities in the form of ritual worship. Other activities will always be monitored by the government and do not even hesitate to be banned when deemed contrary to the interests of the authorities.

In running the organization, al-Washliyah is supported by five principles of organizational development, namely:

1. The principle of tawhid. The creed adopted by al-Washliyah divides monotheism into 3 types: monotheism (\textit{tauhid rububiyyah}), \textit{uluhiyyah} and \textit{Asma wa sifat}. Practicing monotheism and staying away from shirk is a consequence of the creed that has been pledged by a Muslim. Every member of al-Washliyah must teach and practice this tawhid teaching with zero tolerance.

2. The principle of jihad. Al-Washliyah interprets jihad as an effort to create moral goodness for all mankind and eliminate conflicts that occur between them. Jihad in this context can be done with wealth or with tanaga / soul.

3. The principle of \textit{Amar Ma'ruf Nahi munkar}. That is calling for good, inviting to do good, calling for leaving evil.

4. The principle of al-Falah (success). Al-Washliyah interprets this principle by having a militant spirit in the context of fostering and building the State.

5. The principle of moderation or liaison (al-washl). Al-Washliyah will always appear as a moderate organization and seek compromise when there are differences and disputes around them.

In addition to the five principles above, al-Washliyah is also built on an ideological framework as an organization based on Islam, having the belief in Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, and based on Syafi'i fiqh. Some even say that al-Washliyah is one of the agents of the spread of Sunni Islam in Indonesia and guards the militant faith from attacks by secular and liberal ideologies.

To strengthen its ideological concept, al-Washliyah developed various studies to explore the literature of the Sunni faith such as: \textit{kifayat al-'Awam}, \textit{Husun al-Hamidiyah} and \textit{al-Dasuqi}. In the field of fiqh, books such as \textit{Matan Taqrib}, \textit{Fath al-Qarib}, \textit{Tuhfah al-Thullab} and \textit{Al-Mahalli} are studied. The ideological frame only applies in associations and on behalf of associations, while in the personal realm each member of al-Washliyah is free to expand and practice their respective understandings and knowledge.
CONCLUSION

Based on the previous description, it can be concluded that the Nahdlatul Wathan, al-Irsyad, and al-Washliyah organizations have diverse national and Islamic visions. This vision developed along with the turbulent socio-political dynamics in Indonesia at that time. First, Nahdlatul Wathan is one of the Islamic organizations that has a very nationalist vision and perspective of nationalism. However, the nationalism (wathaniyah) of Nahdlatul Wathan does not necessarily follow the trend developed by secular Western-European countries. The nationalism that Nahdlatul Wathan guides is Religious-Nationalism, namely nationalism that does not come out of religious principles and teachings, nationalism that is built on religious values, and nationalism that synergizes with religion because it is part of religious teachings. In many ways, Nahdlatul Wathan's national and Islamic vision is very similar to that of Nahdlatul Ulama. Both of them accepted Pancasila as the principle of organization, believed in Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, and highly valued Islamic culture as a link in the chain of Islamic scholarship.

Second, unlike Nahdlatul Wathan, al-Irsyad was present as a representative of Islamic reform organizations in Indonesia, apart from Muhammadiyyah and Persis. Its presence is colored by the development of territorial sentiments positioning itself as "the other", namely as Arab-Hadrami people. The social and spiritual dichotomy between the sayyid and non-sayyid communities also enlivened the early history of the establishment of al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah. Conditions like this made al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah, at the beginning of its establishment, still half-heartedly accepted Indonesia as a state. Sentiment to Hadramians is still very strong and gives rise to imaginary projections that even though they live in Indonesia, their country is Hadramaut. This condition slowly changed after al-Irsyad Islamiyyah officially became part of Islamic organizations in Indonesia. They unanimously admit that they are part of the Indonesian nation. However, in terms of accepting Pancasila as the principle of organization, the residents of al-Irsyad differed in opinion which led to the emergence of two schools of thought within al-Irsyad, the school that accepted Pancasila and the school that rejected Pancasila as the organization's principle.

The Islamic perspective developed by al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah is salafiyyah in the style of Islamic reformers such as Muhammad Abduh, al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida. Not salafiyyah-wahabiyyah as developed by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This can be proven when there is an internal conflict between the administrators of al-Irsyad and the caretakers of the al-Irsyad Islamic boarding school in the Land of Ja'far Umar Thalib who are affiliated to the salafiyyah
Wahhabiyyah. Usually, salafiyyah da’wah and Islamic reform organizations, the Islamic orientation developed by al-Irsyad is to purify Islamic teachings from all forms of deviation (tahayyul, bid’ah, and kherafat) and to return all Islamic practices to their authoritative source, namely the Qur'an, wa al-Sunnah (al-ruju' ila al-kitab wa al-sunnah).

Third, as for al-Washliyyah, its existence as an Islamic mass organization is not as big as Nahdlatul Wathan and al-Irsyad. The ups and downs of organizational management made it difficult for al-Washliyyah to develop, coupled with management conflicts and political pressure from the new order regime, increasingly made al-Washliyyah an organization that "walked in place". Al-Washliyyah's vision of nationality is very firm, which is to become an inseparable part of the Indonesian nation and state. Even some of the founders of the organization were also involved in the struggle, both in the process of seizing and post-independence. However, in terms of acceptance of Pancasila as the principle of organization, al-Washliyyah experienced ups and downs. In the new order era, al-washliyah accepted the single principle of Pancasila, while in the reform era al-washliyah returned to the organizational khittah, which was based on Islam. Not much different from NU and Nahdlatul Wathan, al-Washliyyah preached the concept of moderate Islam based on the creed of Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah, Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, and respecting turats (the works of classical scholars) as a connector for Islamic scholarship to maintain its originality.

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